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Transcriptivism: An ethical framework for modern linguistics 
Tyler Kibbey* 
Abstract. Descriptivism is a methodologically efficacious framework in the 
discipline of linguistics. However, it categorically fails to explicitly account for the 
moral responsibilities of linguists, as moral agents. In so doing, descriptivism has 
been used as a justification for indifference to instances and systems of linguistic 
violence, among other moral shortcomings. Specifically, many guidelines for 
descriptive ethics stipulate that a linguist “do no harm” but do not necessarily require 
the linguist to prevent harm or mitigate systems of violence. In this paper, I delineate 
an ethical framework, transcriptivism, which is distinct from research ethics and 
covers the line of philosophical inquiry related to questions of the moral agency of 
linguists and their moral responsibility. The potential for this new framework is 
demonstrated through a case study of conflicting Tennessee language ideologies 
regarding gender-neutral pronoun usage as well as an analysis of misgendering as an 
act of linguistic violence. 
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1. Introduction: Transcriptivism defined. It is an often-overlooked fact that the study of
language is traditionally the description of language, or the cataloging thereof. As language is 
linguistics’ principle object of study, this fact may be at best an unremarkable observation to be 
found in any introductory linguistics classroom and, at worst, a tautological representation of 
linguistics as a discipline- to study is to describe, as it were. Historically, the commitment to 
describe language usage (descriptivism) and the contrasting individual or institutional inclination 
to dictate “proper” language usage (prescriptivism) have assumed myriad mutable forms and 
definitions, settling into somewhat concrete theoretical and epistemological models only 
recently. This has had the perhaps unintentional effect of marginalizing discipline-specific moral 
inquiry within the field, wherein such moral inquiries have often been associated with the 
prescriptive enterprises of the non-linguist. By moral inquiry, I do not mean to say that research 
ethics have been neglected nor do I mean to mischaracterize linguists as immoral agents within 
academia. Rather, the question that I intend to entertain here concerns the moralities of finished 
products and their proliferation in public spaces. Specifically, do linguists have a moral 
obligation to exercise linguistic expertise on language-related social issues that extend beyond a 
pure description of how linguistic agents operate? If linguists are moral agents within society and 
not simply undertaking an academic exercise in truth-making, then it must be said, adamantly 
and without reservation, that linguistics as a discipline must reconcile the moral responsibility of 
linguists with its commitment to empirical research. In brief, if descriptivism requires neutrality 
on moral issues, then the methodology as it stands must be considered immoral. In this paper, I 
introduce transcriptivism as an ethical framework within which these questions may be 
approached with the same academic rigor allowed to descriptivist projects, and I further argue 
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that its inclusion within the field will allow linguistics to more critically address social issues 
related to language, including linguistic violence. 
First and foremost, it may be of some use to delineate transcriptivism from other lines of 
ethical inquiry in the field of linguistics, Figure 1 below. Essentially, transcriptivism is a 
framework within which linguists take moral stances in relation to the object of their research 
and its academic products. Within this framework, linguists  must go beyond describing 
language in order to transcribe linguistic knowledge. Specifically, whereas descriptivism and 
prescriptivism constitute paradigms of linguistic stance, the framework I propose here is 
concerned with the moral stances that linguists, as language scientists, take in relation to 
linguistics and its social role beyond the academy. By means of the transitive property, 
transcriptivism is also concerned with language and language usage, but only through the lens of 
descriptive practice. Therefore, I am not undertaking an argument against the paradigm of 
descriptivism, but rather, I structure transcriptive practice as an argument for the moral 
responsibility of linguists beyond the fundamental concerns of research ethics. Thus, I will not 
seek to explore the paradigm of prescriptivism (for a detailed account, see Curzan 2009, 2014) 
nor attitudes toward prescriptive ideologies (Straaijer 2016).  
Figure 1. Transcriptivism delineated from other sub-domains 
In order to demonstrate the hierarchical relationships stated in figure 1 above,  let us explore 
a simple thought experiment building from Saussure’s (1972) example of the word arbre1. 
Within the domain of language, the word itself, its referent world-object, and the various 
attributes of its production (e.g. its phonology, morphology, syntactic distribution, semantics, 
etc.) exist simply within the linguistic system as a vehicle of communication. As of yet, nothing 
has been predicated of its fitness as a sign. However, in that humans are social, communicative 
beings, we are constantly aligning ourselves with language attitudes regarding the production of 
words: through folk linguistics, individuals may construct theories of the word’s origins or of the 
word’s production and usage, and regarding Verbal Hygiene (Cameron 1995), they may even 
perform some level of linguistic maintenance regarding the word’s usage within interpersonal 
1 Although Saussure’s examination of the word arbre was in reference to linguistic signs, I assume Saussure as a 
starting point as his work was influential in establishing the logical positivism inherent to modern descriptivism.  
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moral negotiation2; through descriptivism, linguists assert the necessity of scientific empiricism 
in the study of language and a neutrality towards linguistic fitness regarding the production of 
words; and through prescriptivism, various institutions outline the perceived correctness of usage 
– the Académie Française would no doubt maintain that arbre possesses an immutably correct
form in citation of the prominent linguistic ideologies of that institution. Altogether, the domain 
of linguistics constitutes the formal and informal frameworks within which individuals take 
stances toward and construct ideologies around the domain of language, though its approach to 
such ideologies have been criticized before (for a thorough argument against Saussure’s logical 
positivism, see Vološinov 1929). 
Yet, in the domain of the philosophy of linguistics, linguists also maintain moral and ethical 
frameworks pertaining to the domain of linguistics; even simply arguing for the empirical 
validity of descriptivism over prescriptivism necessitates some philosophical moralizing. Here, I 
delineate three sub-domains: research ethics, meta-theory, and transcriptivism. The distinction 
between these sub-domains is a matter of their object. Succinctly, research ethics is concerned 
with research process; meta-theory is concerned with linguistic theory; and transcriptivism is 
concerned with research products as well as with the moral responsibilities of linguists. Of 
course, process, form, and product are inextricably connected in any science, let alone 
linguistics. Therefore, their differentiation here is largely artificial for the purposes of this paper. 
Now, returning to our thought experiment, what can this superordinate domain tell us about a 
descriptivist approach to the word arbre? Probably not much. The word arbre is, to my 
knowledge, hardly that which necessitates a moral stance. However, if one replaced the word 
arbre in our thought experiment with the word faggot, it is easy to see how this might alter a 
linguist’s position or impose certain moral obligations. A purely descriptive approach would do 
nothing on its own to condemn the word as a slur: it would only be capable of describing its 
usage, distribution, and any accompanying attitudes or ideologies.  
However, the ideals of transcriptivism as a framework are not entirely new to the field of 
linguistics. Exceptionally, Rickford and King (2016: 980) ask that “if language is what most 
distinctly makes us human, shouldn’t linguists (the experts on language) be more centrally 
involved in vital human issues involving language?” The authors go on to state, in reference to 
the unjust treatment of Rachel Jeantel’s usage of AAVE during the George Zimmerman trial, 
that it is linguistics itself that is on trial. While not explicitly affirmed, the authors outline the 
moral responsibility of linguists regarding the widespread mischaracterization of dialects other 
than Standard English in the courtroom. Proactively, they offer numerous suggestions for 
fulfilling that responsibility: they argue that linguists should 1) conduct further research on cross-
dialect intelligibility, while being sensitive to the intersection of language and race, 2) be willing 
to take part in legal cases involving AAVE speakers, 3) work to uplift the voices and 
perspectives of vernacular speakers through education on the subject, 4) provide vernacular 
speakers the assistance needed to learn Standard English “as an additional variety if they want 
to,” 5) advocate for vernacular dialect interpreters in the courtroom, 6) work to end “peremptory 
strikes against African American jurors,” 7) advocate for juror access to transcripts and for 
2 At first glance, Transcriptivism and Verbal Hygiene, as developed in Cameron (1995), may appear remarkably 
similar. The difference here is that Verbal Hygiene concerns the morality of prescriptive judgments in popular 
discussion and that Transcriptivism concerns the moral obligation of linguists, as scientists, in relation to descriptive 
frameworks. In that these descriptive Linguistics is concerned with language and that linguists are simultaneous 
members of language communities, there may be some overlap between Transcriptivism and Verbal Hygiene. 
However, as demonstrated in this paper, any overlap is purely incidental to the unavoidable fact that linguists are 
also language users, as being such is a necessary hazard of the field.  
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linguists to assist in checking the accuracy of such, and 8) participate in wider consciousness-
raising in relation to these issues. Finally, Rickford and King (2016: 982) conclude their paper 
with a brief, yet profound, call to action: “Language lives in society, and so must we.” With this, 
they end their paper with a call for moral responsibility in the discipline of linguistics in a way 
that clearly demonstrates the dangers of language-related social issues and their impact on 
vernacular speakers as well as what is at stake when moral neutrality is normalized within the 
discipline.  
Another instance in which issues of moral responsibility have been tentatively explore, 
Charity Hudley et al. (2018) argue that the broad definitions of race that have been used in 
linguistics over the past 50 years are underdeveloped and unsuited for contemporary research, 
going on to affirm the necessity for an LSA statement on race. The authors go on to state that 
“As a predominantly white discipline rooted in a liberal, Boasian rejection of scientific racism, 
linguistics struggles to confront its role in reproducing racism” (6). Furthermore, they go on to 
outline several suggestions for how to address racism as it arises and is reproduced in the 
discipline: linguistics must 1) acknowledge the legacy of colonial racism within the field, 2) 
provide critiques of research claims that aid in the production of racialized inequality, 3) avoid 
reliance on outdated conceptual frameworks that propagate racial erasure and displacement,  4) 
critically address the obfuscation of whiteness in linguistics research, and 5) understand the ways 
in which white supremacy is upheld by racialization. Far from prescriptivist, the authors are 
concerned with moral questions arising from linguistics research that exist beyond the scope of 
research ethics. Wherein that sub-domain articulates the ethics of conducting research, the 
authors here explore issues arising from producing research and the effects of such on both the 
discipline and society. Like Rickford and King (2016), the authors’ exploration of these pressing 
disciplinary issues falls beyond the scope of what has hereunto constituted the ethical 
frameworks of linguistics and demarcates the moral boundaries between moral responsibility and 
the pursuit of blind truths.  
2. “Do no harm.” As mentioned above, the interconnectedness of process, form, and product
poses a problem to focused analysis, especially concerning ethics. Here,  I consider work on 
research ethics in linguistics as a matter of process and demonstrate how such a narrowing of 
moral inquiry often marginalizes and obfuscates the ethical concerns of the research product. 
Specifically in reference to research populations, Eckert (2013: 25) remarks “individual linguists 
are not necessarily equipped to change society, or to ‘apply’ their work. But it is a linguist’s 
responsibility to understand the potential effect of research results and conclusions on wider 
regimes of knowledge.” This position is in line with the seemingly omnipresent “Do No Harm” 
principle of descriptivist ethics3. For example, the LSA’s “Ethics Statement”4 (2009) lists five 
categories of responsibilities: a responsibility to individual research participants, to communities, 
to students and colleagues, to scholarship, and to the public. It is this last category which is of 
preeminent importance to transcriptivism. The LSA asserts that linguists should endeavor to 
make their research accessible to non-experts, with clearly stated methodologies and limitations, 
and that linguists should “give consideration to likely misinterpretations of their research 
findings, anticipate the damage they may cause, and make all reasonable effort to prevent this” 
3 Eckert (2013) includes this consideration of linguistic ethics, specifically in reference to products of linguistic 
knowledge, only in the final product and only regarding how the research findings may affect the research 
population. Thus, even though this is ostensibly within the framework of Transcriptivism as presented here, her 
approach remains confined within the “Do No Harm” principle of descriptive ethics.  
4 Available at https://www.linguisticsociety.org/sites/default/files/Ethics_Statement.pdf. 
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(5). While I agree that the potential for inadvertently causing harm is a serious issue and deserves 
inclusion in any scientific ethics framework, the statement mentions nothing specifically about a 
responsibility to public issues involving language. However, I am not arguing that the LSA does 
not engage in public issues relevant to linguistics. As an institution, the society has issued 
numerous statements in support of various issues and in condemnation of a range of injustices, 
including a 2016 resolution in support of resistance against the Dakota Access Pipeline5 and a 
1997 statement essentially supporting the Oakland Ebonics program6. I am also not arguing that 
research ethics have been neglected in the field, as many have already provided contributions to 
that topic (Bowern 2010, Kubanyiova 2008). The problem here is whether or not individual 
linguists are also considering these social issues in their own research, and if not, how this moral 
abdication is justified in the discipline. In this case, “Do No Harm” does not necessitate an 
obligation to do good.  
This is perhaps what differentiates the two moral projects outlined in the previous section. 
While Charity Hudley et al. (2018) largely limit their recommendations to ways in which 
systems maintaining and supporting racialized ideologies may be addressed in the field, Rickford 
and King’s (2016) recommended solutions are much more explicitly outward oriented, focusing 
on how linguists may benefit society and aid in resisting racialized linguistic injustices. The 
former is motivated towards discipline internal moral questions, and the latter is motivated 
towards discipline external moral obligations. While moral inquiry within the discipline is 
crucial for the avoidance of causing harm through research products, it does not constitute an 
explicit call for fulfilling any sort of moral obligation beyond the discipline. This should not be 
understood as a criticism of Charity Hudley et al.’s (2018) development of an LSA statement on 
race – far from it, this project is of central importance to contemporary linguistics; however, they 
only address issues regarding how linguistics can cause harm, in so much that it violates some 
principle of harm avoidance rather than how it fails to perform a social good for the public. 
Therefore, their project is moral, but their stance toward the moral responsibilities of linguists to 
society remains morally neutral in general. In contrast, Rickford and King (2016) consider moral 
issues external to the discipline, going beyond the morally neutral to the morally obligatory. In 
this discipline external approach to morality, maintaining neutrality as a matter of descriptivist 
principle is fundamentally immoral and constitutes an abdication of morality in the face of 
language-related injustice. Both an internal and external approach to moral inquiry within the 
discipline is essential for a more critical consideration of moral questions in linguistics, but it is 
likewise necessary to acknowledge that moral neutrality, while not causing harm, allows for 
harm.   
3. Moral responsibility and its abdication. As linguists, what is our moral responsibility to
society, and what would such an obligation entail? In consideration of the work of Noam 
Chomsky, in linguistics and in political philosophy, one might reasonably conclude that linguists 
have a moral responsibility to the betterment of society contingent on the academy and not the 
discipline specifically. Thus, while his argument for Universal Grammar may continue to be a 
source of debate for some time, Chomsky has contributed intellectually to many pressing 
contemporary issues in international relations and political theory, both in criticism and in 
proposing solutions (2006, 2013, and numerous other works). One might even conclude that his 
5 Available at https://www.linguisticsociety.org/news/2016/12/20/lsa-executive-committee-approves-statement-
dakota-access-pipeline-and-sioux-nations. 
6 The LSA resolution on Ebonics was also noted in Rickford and King (2016). Available at 
https://www.linguisticsociety.org/resource/lsa-resolution-oakland-ebonics-issue. 
5
development of anarcho-liberalism7 in political theory is in part derivative of his argument for an 
innate system of grammar, representative of the fundamental equality of humans outside of the 
artificial institutions of modernity: of note here, he states that “Language, in its essential 
properties and the manner of its use, provides the basic criterion for determining that another 
organism is a being with a human mind and the human capacity for free thought and self-
expression” (2013: 126). Whatever be the relation between his political philosophy and linguistic 
program, Chomsky does not specifically fulfill a moral responsibility to linguistic concerns, 
though he may at times touch on these concerns indirectly. While his goals are generally oriented 
toward the betterment of society and the critique of oppressive institutions, he has not fulfilled 
any specific moral obligations to the transcription of linguistic knowledge in such endeavors. 
In contrast, George Lakoff has applied his own work on Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980) to contemporary issues in political philosophy and discourse, largely in 
criticism of conservative and neo-liberal political models (1991, Lakoff & Johnson 1987). For 
instance, he provides the metaphor nation as family as a deconstruction of American systems of 
political ideology and morality, wherein conservative institutions specifically function under the 
“strict father” model and liberals work within a “nurturing parent” model (Lakoff 2006: 66-68). 
Yet, Lakoff also takes great pains to make it clear that he is not undertaking a prescriptivist 
project: “I am describing these models, not proposing them. To observe the existence of the 
nation-as-family metaphor in the cognitive unconscious of Americans is not to say that it is good 
or bad. It is simply there” (68). Although he is using linguistic methodology and research to 
support his argument, Lakoff is not taking a moral stance regarding that research or to the 
described cognitive models themselves; in many ways, while he may condemn the goals and 
outcomes of particular ideologies, Lakoff retains a neutral perspective in how they pursue 
ideology through conceptual framing and metaphors (2008). Therefore, he, like Chomsky, is not 
operating within what we may now call transcriptivism, precisely because he fails to take a moral 
stance towards linguistic concerns and the research thereof. 
The works of Chomsky and Lakoff serve as important examples of socially engaged writing 
that simultaneously maintains a moral neutrality regarding linguistics and, indirectly, language. 
Even in Lakoff’s “[this] is not to say that it is good or bad,” one can observe the fundamental 
danger of modern descriptivist approaches to language. Within this framework, everything 
becomes simply production and perception. Yet, there has been a growing number of linguists 
who have considered issues of linguistic morality, or perhaps linguistic justice, in their own 
research to at least a marginal degree. These approaches have criticized what populations are 
centralized in research practices, attempted to integrate intersectional approaches to language 
into their methodology, or have considered the effects of oppressive institutions on identity-
construction through language (Charity Hudley et al. 2018, Kiesling 2018, Barrett 2017, Blau 
2017, Rickford and King 2016, Levon 2016, Kubanyiova 2008, Lippi-Green 1997). Nonetheless, 
these approaches to varying degrees have set consideration of moral obligation to the side or 
avoided the topic altogether.  
Yet, one would expect that linguists, as moral agents, must have some level of moral 
obligation to social issues involving language, and if so, a failure to meet those obligations must 
constitute an abdication of morality in favor of hard empiricism. While not all linguistics 
research may be considered easily applicable to a transcriptive ethical framework (syntax and 
formal semantics, for example), it still seems contingent upon linguists to not only weigh the 
7 While he uses this terminology, he does align himself, by his own admission, more closely with European 
Libertarianism, but avoids the term Libertarian mostly to prevent confusion with the American Libertarian tradition. 
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potential for harm stemming from a possible research program but also the potential for that 
research to cause some good or effect some change in society (Douglas 2003). This was perhaps 
best explored in the now neglected field of Peace Linguistics, which David Crystal, in 1999, 
described as “[a discipline in] which linguistic principles, methods, findings, and applications 
were seen as a means of promoting peace and human rights at a global level” (qtd. in Curtis 
2017). The essential goals of this sub-discipline can still be found in the LSA statements to the 
United Nations on the rights of children, specifically the right to an education in their native 
language8. So, a sense of moral obligation exists in some form in linguistics, but the limits and 
entailments of such obligations and what constitutes an abdication thereof remain under-
determined in wider disciplinary debate. 
4. Linguistic violence and disarmament. Now, how can we attempt to define the moral
obligations specific to linguistics. It must first be said that, through delineating transcriptivism 
from other ethical frameworks, I am not arguing for a universal ethics: I am not promoting one 
moral theory over another, and I am not claiming to know the methodological needs of every 
linguistic sub-discipline. Rather, in this paper, I want to explore one area of language usage that 
descriptivism categorically fails to account for morally and with which I base the foundations of 
an argument for transcriptivism: Linguistic Violence, by which I mean, instances of language, 
language usage, or language ideology that enact some form of violence (e.g. psychological, 
physical, social, etc.) on an individual or group. Necessarily, this definition is broad by design. It 
is meant to capture the central problem of descriptive linguistics in its most obvious form. For 
example, slurs must be considered an instance of linguistic violence9; and within descriptivism, 
linguists may describe the violence of slurs but are not required to condemn them as instances of 
violence. Furthermore, descriptivism may even be used to argue in favor of certain slurs, for 
instance in idiomatic language, on the grounds that moral claims fall outside of descriptivist 
projects. This harkens back to Lakoff’s assertion that cognitive models in political ideology are 
neither good nor bad – they simply exist in language (2006). However, while Lakoff may have 
glossed over the more complex issues of the violence enacted by certain political ideologies, it is 
clear in the case of slurs that an amoral stance entertains an implicit indifference to violence and, 
therefore, an indifference to the effects of such violence. 
It is worth mentioning here, however, a few parallel theories of linguistic violence that are 
not entirely in opposition to my own definition, though the scope of their definitions are much 
narrower. One popular, early theory of violence presented by Hannah Arendt (1970) in her 
consideration of totalitarian systems of power draws a hard line between language that causes 
violence and the act of physical violence itself. Though she expands the notion of physicality to 
include structural and material forms of violence, Arendt’s project would not have included 
linguistic violence as a legitimate category; instead language is considered as the manipulative 
mechanism with which power violence is enacted, but it is of a vastly different order. More 
recent interpretations of the relationship between language and violence have taken stronger 
8 Both statements were authored by Michel DeGraff. The 2016 LSA statement on the Linguistic Rights of Children 
is available at 
http://www.linguisticsociety.org/sites/default/files/LSA_DeGraff_UN_Childrens_Rights_Comments.pdf and the 
2017 LSA statement on Protecting the Rights of Children in Humanitarian Situations is available at 
https://www.linguisticsociety.org/news/2017/09/15/lsa-submits-comments-un-protecting-right-children-
humanitarian-situations. 
9 I can imagine some possible arguments to the contrary, but I will not dwell on them for the purposed of this paper. 
In the best of possible worlds, there would be consensus on the violence of slurs and hate speech, but I recognize 
that, realistically, this is not the case. 
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approaches, challenging the idea of “war and mass murder as ‘voiceless’ acts of violence and 
[pointing] out that no human action unfolds without linguistic and symbolic meanings and 
contexts” (Kaplan 2009: 9). Though his treatment of the concept here is specific to the Holocaust 
and Nazi discourse, Kaplan builds from Arendt’s earlier differentiation of linguistic and physical 
violence to argue for their immutable interconnectedness. However, not all forms of linguistic 
violence lead to genocide. To clarify this problem, William Gay argues that linguistic violence 
can be placed along a continuum from subtle forms such as children’s jokes to abusive forms 
such as racist, sexist, or homophobic language, and ultimately to the grievous forms of violence 
that seek to silence or eliminate entire populations (1998a). Altogether, while instances of 
language usage may not constitute literal acts of physical violence, there is some consensus on 
the issue about how language can enact and structure systems of violence, even in intermediate 
forms. 
Therefore, I argue that linguists, as experts in the study of language, have a moral obligation 
to unequivocally condemn instances of linguistic violence, wherein they have an inherent 
capacity to cause harm to individuals and marginalized social groups. In fulfilling this obligation, 
I further argue that linguists must go beyond a simple condemnation and instead pursue the 
disarmament of linguistic violence. This linguistic disarmament would entail, within a 
transcriptivist framework, the active application of linguistics research to the task of mitigating 
or preventing violence as it occurs in relation to language. By definition, this far exceeds the 
limits of the “Do No Harm” principle and is in all senses a completely unrealistic project. 
Humans have a natural capacity, if not a proclivity, for violence. Such a regretful fact has been 
observed by innumerable historians, philosophers, and misanthropes over the centuries (Girard 
1972, Arendt 1970, amongst many others). Therefore, regardless of the moral obligations of the 
linguist, to what extent can linguistic violence be successfully disarmed? In on such attempt at 
clarifying this issue, William Gay attempts to provide a solution in the form of linguistic 
nonviolence but fails to convincingly disentangle nonviolent discourse from utilitarian systems 
or power (1998b). Essentially, linguistic nonviolence cannot convincingly extricate itself from 
the same systems of violence that it attempts to resist. Furthermore, as was detailed earlier, 
recent contributions to this line of inquiry have offered solutions to both internal and external 
moral questions – as well as racialized forms of linguistic violence, both as a matter of language 
and of linguistics as a discipline – and have considered the effects of these proposals beyond the 
academic institution (Rickford & King 2016, Charity Hudley et al. 2018). Yet, how to generalize 
a principle of linguistic disarmament, as a counter to linguistic violence, remains a problem for 
any linguistic moral framework. It could be as simple as stating in a publication that linguistic 
act X is morally reprehensible or making it clear that linguistic act X enacts violence within 
historical and contemporary systems of oppression. However, moral neutrality – or to frame it 
more actively, the abdication of morality – is in no way an adequate solution. It is morally 
contingent upon linguists to take a stance on language and its usage when it constitutes linguistic 
violence. 
To better demonstrate the issues at hand, specifically how to incorporate transcriptive 
approaches to Linguistics within research on language usage, I consider here a small case study 
in linguistics research on language ideology in the state of Tennessee during the Fall of 2015 and 
the Spring of 2016. During that time, the University of Tennessee’s Pride Center published a 
gender-neutral pronoun guide on the university’s website. Specifically, the pronoun chart 
included a variety of gender-neutral pronouns: they/them/theirs, ze/hir/hirs, ze/zir/zirs, and 
xe/xem/xyrs. As was and remains evident, the chart listed the pronouns only as a guide to usage 
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and not as a mandate on usage: no one was being forced to radically alter their idiolect, but the 
guide was meant to educate those unfamiliar with gender-neutral and non-binary pronouns.  
Following its publication, many conservative state politicians decried the pronoun guide as 
political correctness run amok, and the resource was later taken down from the university 
website. As a result, the Tennessee State Legislature passed the Tennessee UT Diversity Funding 
Bill, which relocated $445,882 from the university’s Office of Diversity and Inclusion and 
completely defunded the UT Pride Center10. In the actual text of the legislation, HB2248 states 
that “State funds shall not be expended by the University of Tennessee to promote the use of 
gender neutral pronouns, to promote or inhibit the celebration of religious holidays, or to fund or 
support sex week,” ostensibly prohibiting any funds being used to support language or events not 
in line with the conservative platform11. Public debate on the issue of inclusive language, 
specifically pronouns, endured throughout the academic year, and many arguments were made 
on both sides for and against such usages. 
Now, within a descriptivist framework, a linguistic account of these events could take 
several different approaches. An obvious appeal would be to affirm the historical validity of 
gender-neutral pronouns in the English language. In essence, this strategy seeks to motivate 
individuals, who we can assume are rational actors, to accept the usage as natural and with 
precedent in the language’s history, while simultaneously defending gender-neutral pronoun 
usage within the LGBTQ+ community. While this line of argument takes an implicit moral 
stance in support of gender-neutral and non-binary pronoun usage, this approach fails to 
condemn those who, motivated by various ideologies, refuse to acknowledge the linguistically 
constructed, propriodescriptive identities of non-binary or gender non-conforming individuals. In 
brief, descriptivism alone fails to condemn misgendering or ant-LGBTQ+ political legislation as  
forms of linguistic violence. Another strategy for the defense of gender-neutral pronoun usage 
might be an analysis of the opposing language ideologies at work in the Tennessee gender-
neutral pronoun crisis. The conservative members of the Tennessee State Legislature would be 
described as prescribing “traditional pronoun usage” as their perceived correct linguistic form, 
and the University of Tennessee’s LGBTQ+ community would be described as prescribing 
gender-neutral pronoun usage as their perceived, though opposing, correct linguistic form. Such 
an analysis may even include a deconstruction of how the Tennessee State Legislature leverages 
its political power to prescribe “traditional” usage through the withdrawal of funding for 
LGBTQ+ programming at the university. However, this strategy would also fail to account for 
the governing body’s legislative enactment of linguistic violence by treating the two prescriptive 
ideologies as equal, in a linguistic sense, and therefore equally flawed, from the perspective of 
descriptivism.  
The conflict between descriptivism and the principals of transcriptivism that I have outlined 
here is evident in the localized academic response to the Tennessee State Legislature’s action in 
Darr and Kibbey (2016).  Though the paper is unremarkable in and of itself, in that it provides an 
elementary account of the history of gender-neutral pronoun usage, it is inherently dissident by 
virtue of its publication through the University of Tennessee’s undergraduate research journal, 
Pursuit. The argument in the paper rarely strays from the theoretical framework of descriptivism: 
10 The full text of the HB2248 in the Tennessee State Legislature Archives can be found at 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=HB2248&GA=109. 
11 Sex Week is a yearly event organized by the Sexual Empowerment and Awareness at Tennessee (SEAT) student 
organization, which is dedicated to LGBTQ+ inclusion, sex positivity, and sexual health education. The organization 
has been the target of several Tennessee state laws since its foundation in 2014. 
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it asserts the historical and contemporary validity of gender-neutral pronouns and explores both 
advantages and disadvantages to gender-neutral pronoun guidelines on university campuses. 
However, the very act of publication in the university’s undergraduate journal, and its 
subsequent publication to the university website, ensured that a gender-neutral pronoun guideline 
would exist in some form on the very website that had been forced to remove the Pride Center’s 
guideline under threat from the state legislature. This is essentially an act of transcriptive 
linguistics, though in an underdeveloped form, as the publication acts as a silent condemnation of 
the Tennessee Legislature’s linguistic violence against the LGBTQ+ community as encoded in 
the defunding of the Pride Center and Office of Inclusion and Diversity. In short, the publication 
undermined the legislature’s attempt to ban gender-neutral pronoun education by forcing a 
decision on academic freedom of speech.  
Note that Darr and Kibbey (2016) do not make any pseudo-prescriptions based in linguistics 
research, nor do they take an explicit moral stance on the Tennessee Legislature’s actions. The 
product of the research, the paper itself, takes a transcriptive approach in that it is inherently 
dissident by design. However, a more thoroughly transcriptive approach would have included an 
explicit condemnation of the  linguistic violence innate to language ideologies which allow for 
misgendering on the basis of “traditional usage” Yet, the paper itself is not purely descriptive 
either, as it undercuts the legislature’s attempt to deny the existence and rights of the state’s 
LGBTQ+ community and implicitly advocates for gender-neutral pronoun usage at the 
university. Furthermore, as it pertains to the moral responsibility of linguists, a transcriptivist 
position would also necessitate public engagement and education, advocacy against related 
LGBTQ+ legislation, and the explicit condemnation of further attempts to deny LGBTQ+ rights 
through legislative and linguistic acts of violence. While the authors do not engage in any 
research that would “cause harm,” they do not take any steps to prevent harm, and the difference 
between the two constitutes the central point of contention between transcriptive and purely 
descriptive approaches to linguistics.  
As a reproach, one might argue that taking a moral stance against ideologies that enact 
linguistic violence, as in the above example, is beyond the capabilities of linguists generally or 
that the linguistic violence in this example is an indirect product of much larger systems of anti-
LGBTQ+ ideologies. While the Tennessee Legislature argues against the promotion of gender-
neutral pronouns, it can be argued that this is too far abstracted from actual instances of 
misgendering and therefore does not itself constitute an act of linguistic violence. So, let us 
consider a simplified version of misgendering as an instance of language usage. Assume that an 
individual, Sam, identifies as non-binary and uses they/them/their pronouns. Another individual, 
Adam, does not recognize non-binary pronouns as a legitimate part of his idiolect, and regardless 
of his membership in the LGBTQ+ community or his personal identity, categorically refuses to 
use them. If Adam knows that Sam uses non-binary pronouns and has not misgendered them by 
accident, then Adam’s refusal to use Sam’s pronouns when referring to them constitutes an 
intentional linguistic act. As a matter of principle, let us also assume that every individual has an 
inviolable right to propriodescriptively determine their own gender identity with the entailment 
that they also have a fundamental right to how that identity is represented linguistically. This 
assumed, Adam’s intentional misgendering of Sam is an act of linguistic violence, or in Gay’s 
(1998a) terminology, an abusive form of linguistic violence. While Adam may not find the act of 
misgendering offensive, as we can assume Sam would, the fact that both are conscious of the 
degradation inherent to intentional acts of misgendering would render Adam’s intentional act an 
oppressive form of language. Excluding the possibility that Adam is unaware of misgendering’s 
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property of degradation, it is evident that Adam is  misgendering Sam as an act of linguistic 
violence.  
In consideration of the example above, any descriptive approach to misgendering that does  
not condemn such an act as a form of linguistic violence is taking part in an explicit abdication of 
morality. Furthermore, Adam himself is maintaining a morally neutral stance in favor of the pure 
description of his own idiolect, making an implicit argument that his usage of language is equal 
to Sam’s. This moral neutrality, in the face of linguistic violence or at the very least oppression, 
represents a fundamentally immoral position. The language of the oppressor is not equal to the 
language of the oppressed. Arguing for such a comparability on the grounds of linguistic 
descriptivism is nothing short of a shameful appeal to empiricism for the sake of empiricism, 
without regard to the harm that is allowed by such a stance.  Though I have only offered a few 
brief examples of linguistic violence specific to the act of misgendering, I feel well-positioned to 
state that linguistic violence in general is a compelling argument for a closer examination of the 
moral responsibilities specific to linguists. There are yet more far reaching and innumerable 
examples of language usage and language-related social issues that require a similar 
examination, and they deserve equal treatment in defining the upper-bounds of transcriptive 
practice.  
5. Conclusion and call to action. Echoing Eckert (2013), not every linguist has the ability to
change society; what is of more concern here, however, is whether or not any attempt was made 
in the first place. By and large, many of the formalist sub-disciplines – syntax, semantics, 
morphology, etc. – may be forgiven if they do not attempt to seek out applications for their work, 
as it can often be highly theoretical. However, there can still be transcriptive approaches to 
formal Linguistics: intersectionality, is one such exemplar. On pursuing intersectional 
frameworks, Crenshaw (1989: 167) states that “we may develop language which is critical of the 
dominant view and which provides some basis for unifying activity… [which] should facilitate 
the inclusion of marginalized groups.” Since its formulation, intersectionality has admittedly 
been an academic buzzword, but it deserves mentioning here as it has become a buzzword. 
Intersectional approaches to linguistics deserve more than the cursory treatment they often have 
received, and there is nothing ostensibly obstructing formal linguistics from incorporating 
intersectionality in their research and practice. Linguists can be transcriptive simply by uplifting 
and including members of marginalized groups in various opportunities within institutions and 
scholarly research. All that is required for linguist to be transcriptive is that we avoid moral 
neutrality within the discipline and in our treatment of language-related social issues. As 
members of society, linguists cannot afford to abdicate moral responsibility when such an 
abdication would allow for immoral acts of any form but especially when those acts are 
linguistic in nature. 
If transcriptivism as outlined here seems cursory, that is because it is. Descriptivism as a 
methodology has for quite some time crept into the domain of linguistic ethics and has 
proliferated a sense of empiricism at all costs. Moral abdication has become normative without 
critical consideration of the moral responsibility that linguists have to society. In attempting to 
“Do No Harm,” linguistics has often elided any obligation to preventing harm and to seeking 
research applications to the betterment of society. So my treatment of linguists’ moral 
responsibility is, by necessity, cursory. While these issues of moral responsibility have been 
considered elsewhere, their treatment has so far been unfocused. I do not pretend to know with 
any certainty the answer to moral philosophy, which has and continues to elude the very 
philosophers who have dedicated their work to its pursuit. Through my brief exploration of 
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linguistic violence, I have attempted only to demonstrate the need for transcriptivism as a 
framework of moral inquiry within linguistics. I have only intended to provide a forum for 
discussion, with the boundaries carefully defined and the stakes made clear. If linguists do not 
seek to address societal issues involving language, who will? Who else would have the expertise 
to do so?  The pursuit of linguistic truths is not sufficient for our work as linguists, and if we 
only avoid causing harm, then the prevention of harm will always be perceived as separate and 
distinct from the discipline’s core, guiding ethics.   
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